Updating Our Impartiality Discussions - Part 2
Newsletter 268 - August 29, 2024
This is the second half of our updated examination of impartiality. In the first half, we reviewed the earlier discussion, adding to it Martin Carcasson's concept of "principled impartiality," which adds the values of good information and "small d-democracy" to the goals which he seeks to achieve as a mediator and facilitator. We also made the observation that being impartial doesn't mean assuming that everyone is equally right. Responding to that, David Eisner shared an additional thought along those lines: "I think that frame could be extended to answer whether bridging 'whitewashes bad actors' with a corollary: "Inviting and welcoming people of all viewpoints to engage doesn't mean that all viewpoints are equally right."
We agree entirely with David, and with Martin's concept of principled impartiality. We now try to apply "principled impartiality" to the Israel/Hamas/Hezbollah/Iran war and to the political conflict in the United States.
Applying Martin's Triangle to the Israel/Gaza/Hezbollah/Iran War
Our stance on the Israel/Gaza (writ large) war can be understood on the basis of the three values Martin Carcasson includes in his notion of "principled impartiality." Complete impartiality needs to be balanced, he says, with two other values: good information and "small-d" democracy (which we call "liberal democracy" or "power-with democracy"). He illustrated his ideas with the diagram we are reprinting from the last newsletter (and which originally came from his National Civic Review article on Principled Impartiality).
So putting Martin's and our values together in the case of Israel, let us first consider the goal of impartiality. We have looked at the evidence we have seen, and found Hamas to be much more in the wrong than we find Israel to be, although we acknowledge, Israel has done things that, in normal circumstances, would, and should, be considered unacceptable. These are not, however, normal circumstances.
Before we continue, let us clarify what we mean by "wrong" in the paragraph above. The words "right" and "wrong" can have two different meanings, and they are often confused. One meaning is whether or not a "fact" is empirically correct or not — whether it is "right" or "wrong." The second meaning of the words "right" and "wrong" is a moral judgment equivalent to "good" or "bad," "virtuous" or "evil." That was the sense in which we used the term above, when we we concluded that Hamas is much more "in the wrong" than Israel is. That is also the meaning that we are attaching to the term in the paragraphs that follow, with the exception (sort of) of the paragraphs on "facts," in which we argue that the casualty data released by Hamas are often wrong in the empirical sense of the word. In addition, the way Hamas is using misleading casualty statistics as a weapon of war is wrong in the value-based sense of the term.
We believe the attack perpetrated by Hamas on October 7 (and related attacks by Iran and its other proxies) to be morally wrong. Though many people see it as just another example of an oppressed minority group trying to overthrow their oppressors, we believe, as does Adam Kirsch, that that is a misinterpretation of the situation. It is an attack based on the notion that Jews are unremittingly evil and must be purged from the Middle East entirely. (See this and this.)
We further believe that Hamas/Hezbollah/Iran's moral justification for this war and their ultimate goal to eliminate Israel and Jews entirely from the Middle East requires us to recognize the limitations of our traditional approaches to peacemaking and peacebuilding. Our traditional tools: negotiation, dialogue, problem-solving workshops, etc. are all aimed at helping deeply divided communities find a way to peacefully coexist with one another. Not surprisingly, these techniques don't work when one of the parties repudiates the very idea of coexistence. This, we think, explains why the many efforts to find a peaceful resolution of this conflict have all ended in failure.
We have tried to explain our evolving thoughts on this crisis in many posts before this (see newsletters 165, 175, 176, 197, 198, among many others) so we will not repeat ourselves here. We would, however, like to highlight one new way of thinking about Hamas' strategy that we came across recently that we haven't discussed.
That is the realization that Hamas isn't just using civilians as "human shields.” They are actually engaging in what Eitan Chitayat and Eli Ezra explain is "tactical civilian sacrifice." These two commentators are not conflict experts, and they are Israelis, which, for many of our readers, might make this video suspect. Still, their straightforward and compelling analysis of this strategy made so much sense that we wondered "why haven't we seen anyone else pointing this out?"
As they explain, their insight derives from a few simple observations. First, Hamas extensively planned and prepared for the attack that they launched on October 7 and the war that they knew was sure to follow. Their plan was clearly to draw Israel into a war that would be fought on their home turf — the urban areas of Gaza. In preparation for this war, they constructed elaborate fortifications designed to protect their fighters and allow those fighters to attack Israelis from positions deeply embedded in Gaza's civilian infrastructure and population. What Chitayat and Ezra found so striking was the fact that, despite building extensive shelters for its fighters, Hamas (unlike Israel) provided no shelters for its civilian population. To them, Hamas' tactic was obvious — they planned to deliberately sacrifice their civilian population (and the civilian infrastructure upon which that population depends) as part of what has become a successful effort to cultivate global sympathy.
We put this fundamentally immoral behavior together with Hamas's barbarous provocation on October 7, their use of civilian shields (which they also do), and their steadfast refusal to coexist with Israel, maintaining, instead, an unwavering commitment to Israel's destruction and the killing of Jews that goes with that. All that goes on one side of the impartiality scale. On the other side, we have Israel's behavior, which has involved massive attacks on Gaza, and limited attacks on Hezbollah in Lebanon, and on one Hamas leader in Iran. And yes, these attacks have caused large numbers of both military and civilian casualties. But most were caused by Hamas's human shield and tactical civilian sacrifice strategies, and Israel went to considerable lengths to avoid civilian casualties by, for example, warning civilians before attacking (thereby warning Hamas's leadership and fighters also to leave), and providing extensive humanitarian aid (though that was diverted by Hamas). For comparison, did the Allies in World War II warn the Germans or the Japanese before they attacked? Did they provide humanitarian aid (during the war) to either? Of course not! And they weren't blacklisted worldwide, for being pariahs or committing genocide. So in our view, the impartiality scale is heavily in favor of Israel, and against Hamas.
Next, let's consider the goal of promoting democracy. While there has been a great deal of discussion about how democratic Israel's governance system is, and how democratic it is going to be in the future, it seems blatantly obvious that it is a much more democratic system than is Hamas' Gaza. That's an exceedingly low bar, of course. While Hamas came to power in an election in 2006, it has stayed in power through ruthless violence. It throws its opponents off of rooftops, so who is going to run or even vote against them? Israel does not have a perfect democracy (who does, these days?). Democracy is a messy, competitive, "hardball" process that is, we believe, still vastly preferable to the kind of brutal authoritarianism that characterizes Hamas', or for that matter, Iran's regime.
That does not, however, negate the need to do as much as possible to limit the suffering of the innocent people of Gaza and all those who live who live under other brutal, authoritarian regimes. The question is how best to do that in this case? Will innocent Gazans be better off by removing Hamas from power or through a "ceasefire" that would allow Hamas to continue to rule and terrorize and sacrifice its own citizens (as well as Israelis)?
Lastly, let's consider facts. The Gaza war is not only a "kinetic" war (being fought on the ground, with guns and bombs). It is also a virtual war that is being played out online in the world of public relations and mass media. This is the battlefield where Hamas seems to be clearly winning with global opinion dramatically shifting away from Israel and toward a growing embrace of global Anti-Zionism and antisemitism directed at Jews worldwide. Hamas' tactics have led to a world in which the news and social media is filled with stories of how Israel is evil, and how the people of Gaza are suffering unjustly at Israel's hands. Hamas has managed to convince much of the world that it is Israel that is committing genocide, when it is Hamas's Charter that has always (and still) calls for the total destruction of the Israeli state, a goal also supported and actively pursued by Iran and its proxies, such as Hezbollah and the Houthis in Yemen.
As Martin rightly points out, it can be hard to distinguish good facts from false facts (or reliable from misleading information). And it is particularly difficult in this case. Still, we must try, by reading and watching as much as we can, assessing where the information comes from, and the process through which it is collected and presented.
Though some people have contested what happened on October 7, the unspeakable atrocities of that day have been extensively documented, including by the Hamas fighters themselves who videoed their attacks and proudly posted the videos on social media. Based on the information we been able to gather (much of which is featured in our weekly Links newsletters), we have can come to the conclusion that there is no doubt that those atrocities were perpetrated by Hamas, and that they were undertaken with the goals of 1) terrorizing Israelis into abandoning the Jewish state and 2) provoking a massive counterattack against heavily entrenched Hamas positions (located in civilian areas with no civilian shelters) that would result in widespread destruction and mass civilian casualties. As explained in the "tactical civilian sacrifice" video cited above, Hamas then planned to exploit those casualties and destruction as the core of a vast public relations campaign designed to portray themselves as victims not aggressors and, thereby, delegitimize Israel's right to exist. While the first goal was not achieved, (most Israelis have nowhere else to go), the second effort has been a spectacular success.
Another key feature of Hamas' strategy has been the systematic manipulation of public images about what, exactly, is transpiring in Gaza. This article (don't be put off by its cryptic title) provides an excellent primmer on the techniques that Hamas has been using to spread disinformation. For example, the article explains Hamas' practice of first releasing grossly exaggerated casualty numbers, and then trying to maintain their credibility by rolling back those numbers to something more realistic "as more information becomes available." Since the rollbacks are slow in coming, they are never really covered in the media; leaving almost everyone basing their assessments on the gross exaggerations that came out first. The article goes on to describe how, by refusing to distinguish civilian from military deaths, Hamas conveys the notion that it's military casualties are actually innocent civilian deaths. Similarly, Hamas makes a big deal about how hard it is for Gazans to meet their basic material needs, without (of course) explaining that Israel has been supplying vast quantities of food and other aide that Hamas has been stealing for their own use or for sale at exorbitant prices.
We know, many of our progressive readers will likely dismiss all this as Israeli propaganda. We simply ask that you look beyond the information bubbles surrounding your usual sources of information (something we actively try to do). Read articles on all sides, see what they base their conclusions on, and see what makes most sense to you.
To us, an impartial look at the mountain of evidence currently available leads to the inescapable conclusion that any reasonable effort to protect the interests of innocent civilians in Gaza, Lebanon, and other places touched by the conflict must explicitly condemn and oppose the goals and tactics of Hamas (and other Iranian proxies involved in this conflict). Conflict resolvers and peacemakers (along with anyone who values good information, impartiality, and democracy) must strongly oppose regimes that reject the very principles of peace, tolerance, co-existence, and liberal democracy. Otherwise, we are likely to find ourselves as enablers of the kind of brutal authoritarianism and aggression that we have always sought to oppose. This is not a case involving a dispute between equally valid interests and viewpoints — the kind of differences that can be negotiated and around which a peace might be built. This is a conflict between a country that accepts these peacebuilding principles (Israel) and a large Iranian-led movement that is explicitly hostile to those principles.
Another critically important consideration is the way in which support of Hamas's and Iran's values is threatening the well being of Jews worldwide, and the well being of democracy worldwide. If Hamas's tactics and behavior are considered laudable there, what might be considered laudable elsewhere, including the United States? Consider John Paul Lederach's recent warning about how toxic polarization has led to protracted war all around the world. If we are to applaud Hamas, and support Hamas, why wouldn't we applaud and support entities that behave the same way in the United States or anywhere else? How is support for Hamas different from support for brutal authoritarian dictatorships destroying democracy all around the world? To us, the only obvious difference is that Hamas is attacking Jews. Is it moral to believe that Jews "deserve this," while other victims of authoritarian aggression do not?
Applying Martin's Triangle to the U.S.A.
So that brings us to the United States, where again, we are trying to apply the same values and the same critical judgment to a complex array of conflicts. Let's look at facts and democracy first, as they are quite intertwined. Trump and his supporters have been spreading false narratives about the 2020 election ever since it happened, and to some extent, even before it happened. They have convinced a large majority of their followers that the Democrats "stole" that election, and will likely steal the next one if they don't take extraordinary measures to prevent that steal. So they appear to be putting those extraordinary measures in place — measures that look very much like the tools needed to steal the November, 2024 election if Trump doesn't win outright. This is most certainly a cause for alarm. So, too, are Trump's declarations that he is going to lock up his political opponents; fire the entire civil service, replacing them with sycophants; and deploy the military to stop protests.
Unfortunately, however, the Republicans' concern about Democrats subverting democracy are also founded on legitimate concerns. One of the most obvious (though still controversial) cases is Chuck Schumer's plans to limit the authority of the Supreme Court, which sound a lot like Netanyahu's "Judicial Reform" that sank Israel into the crisis that likely lay the groundwork for the Hamas attack. Progressives' widespread efforts to demand loyalty to their "diversity, equity, and inclusion" (DEI) values throughout both the public and private sector, when "inclusion" does not include white Christians or, now, Jews, is also deeply problematic. Democrats have also been pursuing what Republicans regard as a comprehensive "lawfare" campaign against Donald Trump — a campaign that, with its recent, controversial, felony convictions is much closer to locking up the former president than many expected. Republicans see this as illegitimate as Trump's calls regarding Hillary Clinton to "lock her up!"
So going way back to the top of this essay, we disagree with Jackie, Bernie, and Lou that the threat to democracy is one sided. It is very much a tit-for-tat, continuously polarizing and escalating dynamic that is not at all likely to end well for anyone unless many people realize the magnitude of the threat and start working much more diligently to cool things down. That is why we are calling for balance, tolerance, compromise, and healing in the case of the United States political conflict, but are not doing so in the case of Israel. (The defeat of Hamas needs to come first.) You cannot have balance, tolerance, compromise and healing with an entity, or multiple entities that seek none of that, but rather seek the other sides' total destruction, even at the cost of their own destruction.
As John Paul Lederach points out in the Pocket Guide we briefly introduced in Newsletter 265, America is not exceptional in its ability to avoid political violence. We are prone to the same dynamics of fear, distrust, hatred, and potentially widespread violence that he has witnessed in his work throughout the world. But we still maintain that the conflict resolution and peacebuilding fields are in a good position to help de-escalate this conflict in the United States before it becomes extremely violent — if they chose to play that roll, instead of playing the role of partisan and fanning the flames.
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